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Introduction
It’s Election Night 2016.1 Brian Williams stands by at NBC, waiting
to give the first returns of the night. “Kentucky to Christie,” Williams triumphantly announces to kick off the evening’s festivities. Kentucky turns
flush red on NBC’s virtual election map. Williams continues: “Maryland to
Clinton.” Now comes the hard part for Williams. Clinton won Maryland
by an incredible two-to-one margin. NBC viewers intently watch the map,
expecting to see the Old Line State turn blue. Instead, Maryland sits idly in
its static grey color. This election has something new.
Confused NBC viewers keep watching, waiting for Williams to
provide an explanation. “We’d love to tell you who will win Maryland
now, but unfortunately we can’t,” Williams says. “We’ll have to wait
until all votes nationwide have been counted.” Realizing that many of
his viewers are likely perplexed by this new electoral voting system,
Williams starts explaining the newly enacted National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (NPVC), in which several states have agreed to
* J.D. Candidate, George Mason University School of Law, 2013; B.A. Journalism, University of
Maryland, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Ilya Somin for his assistance with this article.
1

This hypothetical scenario is for illustrative purposes only.
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allocate their Electoral College delegates to the winner of the national
vote, as opposed to the traditional state vote.
Debate about the Electoral College has raged through the years,
but it came to the forefront of national political attention after the 2000
presidential election produced the fourth electoral “misfire” in United
States history.2 In 2001, law professors Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram
David Amar introduced the idea of state legislatures allocating their
respective electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote.3
Five years later, the organization “National Popular Vote,” consisting of
a bipartisan group of prominent current and former congressmen, held
its initial press conference in Washington, D.C. to explain the legislation
that would soon be introduced in all 50 U.S. states.4 National Popular
Vote introduced the NPVC, which, if adopted by enough states, would
essentially replace the constitutionally mandated Electoral College
with a direct national popular vote.5 Significantly, this law would be
enacted by a horizontal agreement among the states, not a constitutional
amendment.6 At the time of this writing, California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington, and the
District of Columbia have enacted the National Popular Vote Compact
(NPVC).7 Cumulatively, these jurisdictions equal 132 of the necessary
270 electoral votes for the NPVC’s provisions to go into effect.8
2
A “misfire” refers to an election in which the presidential candidate who won the most popular
votes failed to win the presidency. There have been four such elections (1824, 1876, 1888, and
2000). Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils
of Sub-Constitutional Change, 100 Geo. L.J. 173 at 196 (2011).
3
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President
Without Amending the Constitution, FindLaw (Dec. 28, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
amar/20011228.html.
4
Prepared Remarks from Press Conference, Nat’l Popular Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.
com/pages/releases/20060223.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
5
Id.
6
See id.
7
Cal Elec. Code § 6920 (West 2012); D.C. Code § 1-1051.01 (West 2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 14D-1
(West 2008); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-5A-01 (West 2011); 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/5 (West 2011);
2010 Mass. Acts Ch. 229; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011); 2011 Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 17, §§ 27512755 (West 2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.56.300 (West 2011).
8
A candidate must receive 270 out of a possible 538 electoral votes in order to win the Electoral College.
Office of the Fed. Reg., A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/procedural_guide.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). This number is derived
from the combination of three different sources. First, the U.S. Census figures determine the number of
congressional representatives each state can have. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (West 2011). Second, 3 U.S.C. § 3 (West
2011) states that “[t]he number of electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives
to which the several States are by law entitled at the time when the President and Vice President to be
chosen come into office.” Third, the Twenty-Third Amendment of the Constitution grants presidential
electors to the District of Columbia, but no more than the least populous state. U.S. Const. amend. XXIII.
Article IV of the NPVC states that “[t]his agreement shall take effect when states cumulatively possessing
a majority of the electoral votes have enacted this agreement in substantially the same form and the
enactments by such states have taken effect in each state.”). 888-Word Interstate Compact, Nat’l Popular
Vote, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php (last visited
Dec. 29, 2012) [hereinafter National Popular Vote Compact].
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If the NPVC is triggered and becomes binding law, the chief election
official in each member state will add up the total number of national
popular votes for each candidate, and the state’s certifying official will
then appoint that state’s slate of electoral votes to the winner of the
national popular vote.9 Member states are permitted to withdraw from
the NPVC, but cannot do so after July 20th in the year of a presidential election.10 As this article will later explain, each state is entitled to
choose how it wants to allocate its electoral votes. Thus, constitutional
scrutiny of the NPVC centers on the manner in which it will be enacted,
not whether each state has the individual power to change its method
of electoral vote allocation.
Part II of this article will discuss the formation of the Electoral
College, the roles that both state and federal governments play in the
election of the President, and the emergence of the NPVC as an alternative to a constitutional amendment. Part III surveys the history of
the Compact Clause, which would be implicated by enactment of the
NPVC. Part IV then takes a detailed look at the principles of federalism
that are inherent in the Electoral College, explores the roles of presidential electors, and concludes that under existing Compact Clause
precedent, the NPVC does not require Congressional consent in order
for it to be effective.
II. Electoral College Background
Article II of the Constitution requires each state legislature to define
a method to appoint electors to vote for the President.11 In McPherson
v. Blacker, a late nineteenth century case, the Supreme Court confirmed
that state legislatures have this plenary power under Article II when it
upheld the Michigan legislature’s proposal to establish a district-based
voting system.12 McPherson affirmed the principle that the Constitution
does not require any particular legislative scheme for appointing presidential electors.13 The Court has said that this power is so exclusively
vested within state legislatures that “the text of the election law itself,

National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
The NPVC states that it “shall govern the appointment of presidential electors in each member
state in any year in which this agreement is, on July 20, in effect in states cumulatively possessing a
majority of the electoral votes.” Id.
11
U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”).
12
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (“[The Constitution] recognizes that the people act
through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define
the method of effecting the object.”).
13
Id.
9

10
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and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance.”14
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates considered several
methods of presidential selection: (1) popular election, (2) election
by state legislatures, (3) election by special electors, and (4) election
by the national legislature (Congress).15 George Mason scoffed at the
idea of having people directly vote for the president, saying “it would
be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief
Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours [sic] to
a blind man.”16 Charles Pinckney, another delegate, feared that under
a direct vote, the populous states would be able to control the outcome
of presidential elections to the detriment of smaller states.17 However,
Pinckney believed this method was the most effective for the selection
of the president, as the legislature would “be most attentive to the
choice of a fit man to carry [the laws passed by the legislature] properly
into execution.”18 Gouverneur Morris thought Pinckney’s fears were
exaggerated, and ensured delegates that even though groups of voters might control the popular will in small districts, “the general voice
of the State is never influenced by such artifices.”19 While the people
might not have known of all activity in Washington, Morris thought
they would know of those “great and illustrious characters which have
merited their esteem & confidence.”20
James Wilson, James Madison, and Morris favored a direct national
vote by the people.21 The delegates to the Convention had originally
decided that Congress would elect the president, but Morris expressed
his opposition to that plan, explaining that the president might turn out
to be a puppet of the legislature, leading to “[c]abal and corruption.”22
Madison initially saw no problem with a direct national vote, as he felt

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000); accord Bradley T. Turflinger, Fifty Republics and the
National Popular Vote: How the Guarantee Clause Should Protect States Striving for Equal Protection in
Presidential Elections, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 793, 825 (2011).
15
James Madison, Notes Of Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787 308 (Adrienne Koch
ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1976). Thomas Paine had a unique proposal that was never discussed during
the Convention—that the delegates from the colonies select the president by lot. Lolabel House,
A Study of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 1 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Philadelphia).
16
Madison, supra note 15.
17
Id. at 307.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 308.
20
Id.
21
Neal R. Peirce & Lawrence D. Longley, The People’s President: The Electoral College in
America and the Direct Vote Alternative 21 (Murray Printing Co. 1981).
22
Madison, supra note 15, at 525.
14
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that “the President [was] to act for the people, not the States.”23 Wilson
introduced the idea that each state send electors to convene and cast
their vote for president in accordance with the popular will of their
respective states.24 This feature, Wilson argued, would prevent state
intervention in the electoral process and “would produce more confidence among the people.”25 A direct national election would diminish
the southern states’ voting power because slaves were represented
as three-fifths of a person for census purposes, but had no concomitant suffrage rights.26 The resulting Electoral College compromise
gave each state a number of delegates equal to the number of its
Congressional representatives.27
In 1788, Congress determined that each state would appoint
presidential electors on the first Wednesday in January of 1789.28 The
Framers projected that the states would use the district system when
deciding how to allocate electors,29 but a complete lack of uniformity
quickly developed for the first presidential election.30 The legislatures
of Georgia, South Carolina, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware
each appointed electors without referencing the citizens of their
respective states in any way.31 The Massachusetts legislature appointed
two at-large electors on its own, and used a district-based system to
allow the people to choose the state’s other electors.32 Maryland and
Virginia each used a district-based system, whereas New Hampshire
and Pennsylvania allowed their citizens to select electors on a general
ticket.33 New York cast no votes, as its legislature’s two houses could
not agree on how to appoint electors.34 For the second presidential election in 1792, nine state legislatures decided that they would themselves
appoint electors.35 Four states used either a district system or general
Id. at 524-25 (emphasis added). Eldridge Gerry, though, feared that “one set of men dispersed
through the Union & acting in Concert” would always be able to determine the president, as they
could override “[t]he ignorance of the people” under a direct national vote. Id. at 50.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Peirce & Longley, supra note 21 (1981). If each state’s vote totals were counted separately and
independent of one another, southern states could reap the benefit of having increased state
citizenship, and thus increased voting power, without having to grant slaves the right to vote. Paul
Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins Of The Electoral College, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1145, 1154–55 (2002).
27
This figure would include the number of representatives in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate. See Robert M. Hardaway, The Electoral College and the Constitution: The
Case for Preserving Federalism 82 (Praeger Publishers 1994).
28
34 Journals of the Continental Congress 613 (Sept. 13, 1788).
29
Letter from James Madison to George Hay Montpellier (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 Max
Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention Of 1787 459 (Yale Univ. Press 1911).
30
Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 32–34.
31
Id. at 32–33.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892).
35
Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 34.
23
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ticket, while New Hampshire and Massachusetts used a system in
which the selection of electors would be shared between the legislature
and the people.36
In 1796, only six out of sixteen states used either the district system
or general ticket.37 That year’s presidential election saw the emergence
of political parties, as Federalist members of Congress caucused to
nominate John Adams as the party’s candidate to succeed George
Washington, while Republican party members organized to nominate
Thomas Jefferson.38 The rise of political parties incentivized the party
in control of the state legislatures to act strategically at the time of each
presidential election.39 For the first several elections in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, some state legislatures would
often make abrupt changes to their method of allocation, such as vesting within themselves the power to appoint and taking away that away
from the citizens.40 For example, on the night before a statewide election,
the Federalist New Jersey legislature, realizing that the election would
not produce the winner it wanted, repealed a state law that called for
the allocation of delegates based on a statewide popular vote.41
In 1818, New Jersey Senator Mahlon Dickerson advocated for uniformity in the election of the president.42 On the Senate floor, Dickerson
recognized the dangers of unpredictability: “[the electoral systems] are
the subjects of constant fluctuation and change—of frequent, hasty,
and rash, experiment—established, altered, abolished, re-established,
according to the dictates of the interest, the ambition, the whim, or
caprice, of party and faction.”43 However, Dickerson conceded that the
lack of uniformity among the states would only be acceptable if each
state made its method permanent.”44 State legislatures slowly caught on
to the general ticket system, and by 1836, South Carolina was the lone
state that had not adopted it.45 Unlike the district system, which might
allow a minority party to pick up some electoral votes, the general
ticket and its “winner-take-all” format gave the ruling political party
of each state the ability to deliver its entire state to the party’s national
candidate.46 Currently, Maine and Nebraska are the only states that do

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 44–45.
Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 45.
Id.
31 Annals of Cong. 178 (1818).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 179–80.
Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 46.
Id. at 46–47.
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not use the winner-take-all system, as each of those states allocates its
electoral votes based on the district method.47
Wilson’s idea of having representative electors was projected
as something far different than what it quickly became in practice.
Alexander Hamilton liked the idea of the states delegating a select
group of electors to represent their state.48 These electors, Hamilton
thought, would produce a better and more informed decision than the
people themselves.49 Because the electors would not formally convene
together, but vote only within their respective states, they would be less
exposed to the “heats and ferments” of being in the physical presence of
each other.50 Hamilton also believed that, because the electors and the
state legislatures’ appointing them were among the “enlightened and
respectable citizens,” the electors would naturally direct towards the
most accomplished candidate for the presidency.51 However, with the
introduction of political parties, Hamilton’s vision that the delegates
would provide a free, unconstrained choice quickly disappeared.52
Instead, “party discipline” was seen as a way of avoiding an executive
branch that had a president and vice president from different parties.53
This rigorous discipline was partly responsible for the result of the
1796 presidential election, which produced John Adams, a Federalist,
as president, and Thomas Jefferson, a Republican, as vice president.54
For decades, a number of constitutional amendments have been
proposed to change the presidential election to a straight national popular vote.55 A 2007 poll assembled by the Washington Post, Kaiser Family
Foundation, and Harvard University showed 72% public support for
a national popular vote to determine the winner of the presidential
election.56 But support for a shift to a national popular vote is nothing
new, as polls have shown 65% of Americans approving of a change to a
direct national vote as early as 1944.57 The NPVC is one of the latest and
most successful attempts to prevent the College from producing such
a misfire. In both 1969 and 1979, proposed constitutional amendments
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 802, 805(2) (West 2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-714, 32-1038(1)
(2011).
48
The Federalist No. 68, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 411–12.
52
John R. Koza, et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan For Electing the President by
Popular Vote 43–44 (3d ed. Nat’l Popular Vote Press 2011).
53
Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just Below the
Surface in Choosing The President, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 121, 128 (2006).
54
Id.
55
See Koza, supra note 52, at 95–131 (providing detailed explanations of previously attempted
amendments).
56
Id. at 276.
57
Id. at 275 (citing a Gallup News Service poll showing that popular support for a direct national
vote got as high as 81% after the 1968 presidential election).
47
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to scrap the Electoral College in favor of a direct popular vote failed to
earn the necessary two-thirds vote from the Senate.58 Since then, however, no Congressional proposals to move towards a national popular
vote have had any success.59
III. The Compact Clause: A Rarely Implicated
and Wide-Open Provision
Among the constitutional provisions likely to be in play in potential litigation concerning the NPVC is the seldom-invoked Compact
Clause.60 In Article I, Section 10, clause 3, of the Constitution, the
Compact Clause is among several restrictions, all of which require
states to obtain some form of Congressional consent:
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”61
Congressional consent is the federal government’s check on the
otherwise free market for states to collude on legislative matters.62
The manner in which Congress must assent to approval of interstate
compacts was initially unclear.63 Justice Story explained that express
congressional consent would leave no doubts as to a compact’s validity
and that implied consent was possible, but provided minimal elaboration of what was required for the implication of congressional consent.64
Story seemed less concerned with the effects that compacts might have
on non-compacting states than with the possibility that they might
infringe upon the powers of the national government.65 He classified
compacts as applying to issues pertaining to “mere private rights of
sovereignty; such as questions of boundary; interests in land situated in
Williams, supra note 2, at 185.
Id.
60
The Equal Protection Clause is also likely to be implicated. See Williams, supra note 2, at 226–28.
61
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
62
See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate Relations: The Neglected Dimension of Federalism
36 (Greenwood Publ’g Group, Inc. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the congressional
consent requirement is to protect the Union by controlling collective actions of states.”). See also
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 496 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“As the
constitutional arbiter of political differences between States, the Congress is the proper body to
evaluate the extent of harm being imposed on non-Compact States, and to impose ameliorative
restrictions as might be necessary.”).
63
See generally Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
64
3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 311 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833).
65
Id. at 310.
58
59
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the territory of each other; and other internal regulations for the mutual
comfort and convenience of states, bordering on each other.”66
Functionally, compacts have taken on a role similar to legislation,
meaning that presidents have veto power.67 Both individuals and states
can seek relief in state and federal court to prevent the obligations of
a compact from coming into effect.68 Federal courts could interpret
compacts under state law only until 1981, when the Supreme Court
said that Congress’ consent to a compact gave it the force of federal
law.69 When compacting parties reach an agreement on a compact, they
must then seek approval from each of the respective state legislatures.70
Initially, governors appointed joint commissions to draft interstate
compacts.71 Since 1930 though, standards have been relaxed regarding
who can be a party to compact negotiations and whether compacting
individuals are required to have authorization to act on behalf of their
respective state legislatures.72
The Compact Clause has its roots in the colonial era, when the colonies set up joint commissions to deal with boundary disputes.73 These
disputes developed as populations within each colony crept up on other
colonies, and disputes emerged over the control of Atlantic seaboard
territory.74 When making agreements among themselves, the colonies
were required to gain approval of the Crown after they negotiated settlements.75 If the colonies could not come to an agreement, their method of
recourse was an appeal to the Crown, with appellate remedies available
in the Privy Council.76 After the American Revolution, the drafters of the
Articles of Confederation, aware of the potentially destructive nature
of boundary disputes and their potential to weaken the young union,
included language in the Articles to assure that the national government
Id.
For example, in 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the Republican River Compact,
believing that it encroached on national interests in appropriating water. 88 Cong. Rec. 3285–86 (1942).
68
See Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 39 (“Although the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen of
one state to sue another state without its consent, a citizen can challenge a compact or its execution
in a state or national court against an individual or in a proceeding to prevent a government officer
from enforcing a compact.” (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
69
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (“But where Congress has authorized the States to enter into
a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject
for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal
law under the Compact Clause.”).
70
See Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 35.
71
Id. at 34.
72
Id. at 34–35 (referencing the Interstate Commission on Crime and regional governors’
conferences as examples of how some compacts are now formed through “ad hoc arrangements”).
73
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution– A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 692 (1925).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 754–55 appx. B (citing the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Settlement of 1740).
66
67
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had control in the remedying of interstate disputes.77 Congressional
consent was established as a requirement for interstate disputes, as the
main concern was that states might “split the confederacy” by way of
an agreement.78 Maryland and Virginia entered into one such compact
under the Articles, as the two states formed an agreement to establish
navigation and fishing rights on the Potomac River.79
Interstate compacts remained permissible under the Constitution,
but states could no longer make treaties or alliances with other states
or nations.80 As Michael Greve explains, the “broad and unqualified” language in the Compact Clause and the other Article I, Section 10 restrictions
on the States reflects “the Founders’ special concern over all-not just
some—state agreements.”81 The Compact Clause’s placement in Article
I, Section 10 of the Constitution is highly relevant to a determination of
the Framers’ original intent with the Clause, as it sits alongside numerous other powers prohibited to the States.82 The Federalist is fairly sparse
in its discussion of the Compact Clause, lumping it in with a discussion of a number of other clauses that were “copied” from the Articles
of Confederation.83 However, Greve views its placement in Article I,
Section 10 as the Framers’ expression of the “Madisonian negative.”84
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison had advocated for
a national veto power over all state legislation.85 Madison wanted the
national government to retain a supervisory role over the states and
prevent them from encroaching on federal prerogatives.86 While other
delegates at the Convention rejected the extreme nature of the proposal,
they agreed with Madison that a “certain species of state laws” needed
to have some form of federal check.87 Specifically, the Framers feared
giving states the exclusive control to handle debtor relief laws, import
duties, and the printing of money.88 Along with the other prohibitions
Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VI, para. 2 (“No two or more States shall enter into any
treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united States
in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered
into, and how long it shall continue.”). Congressional consent under the Articles of Confederation
was different in that the congressional body itself was different-a unicameral one instead of the
bicameral one that is in place today. Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 33.
78
Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 33.
79
Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 163–165 (1894). The Court also explained that even though the
compact was entered into before the Constitution, it was still valid, as it did not conflict in any way
with the Constitution. Id. at 167–68.
80
Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 Election
L.J. 372, 379 (2007).
81
Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 285, 297–98 (2003).
82
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
83
The Federalist No. 44, at 277, 280 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
84
Greve, supra note 81, at 313.
85
Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 649 (1999).
86
Id.
87
Greve, supra note 81, at 313.
88
Id.
77
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in Article I, Section 10, compacts were treated as part of a “clas[s] of
state laws with a manifest detrimental effect on sister states.”89
Compact Clause case law is sparse, but the Supreme Court has
provided a broad framework for which Compact Clause questions are
to be addressed. One of the early leading cases on the Compact Clause
did not concern the Compact Clause at all.90 In Holmes v. Jennison,91
Chief Justice Taney explained that the governor of Vermont did not
have the authority to enter into an informal agreement with Canadian
authorities to deliver a Canadian citizen who had been arrested in
Vermont.92 Fearing that individual states could gain the power of deciding their own exclusive conditions on which to negotiate with foreign
countries,93 Taney realized that to allow the states to form agreements
in this manner would infringe on the federal government’s exclusive
treaty-making power.94 However, Taney did not determine that the
agreement was flat out impermissible, but that it had to be “made under
the supervision of the United States,” thus giving some meaning to the
congressional consent requirement in the Constitution.95 Though the
agreement at issue in Holmes addressed an agreement between a state
and a foreign country, not one between states, scholarship suggests
that the same principles apply to the federal government’s supervisory
interest in either instance.96
Fourteen years later, in Florida v. Georgia,97 Taney clarified that the
vertical protection established in Holmes was to be evaluated by way of
a horizontal component. Taney explained that the Compact Clause’s
purpose was to protect the interests of the non-compacting states.98
Id. (“Uniformly, the prohibitions and negatives are directed against classes of state laws with a
manifest detrimental effect on sister states. As Madison might have put it, the Convention sought
to arrest factionalism at the borders.”). See also, Gillian Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate
Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1500–01 (2007) (“What nonetheless remains notable about
Section 10 is that it represents an express articulation of the interstate model also evident in the
other constitutional interstate provisions--that is, prohibitions on the states that are independently
binding but subject to ultimate congressional control.”).
90
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 578 (1840) (plurality opinion).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 578.
93
Id. (“Such conflicting exercises of the same power would not be well calculated to preserve
respect abroad or union at home.”).
94
Id.
95
Holmes, 39 U.S. at 578. See also Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185, 209 (1837) (“If Congress consented,
then the states were in this respect restored to their original inherent sovereignty; such consent
being the sole limitation imposed by the constitution . . . .”).
96
Greve, supra note 81, at 298 (“The text of the Clause, of course, treats state agreements with
foreign powers on a par with state-to-state agreements. If it compels a rigid interpretation in
the foreign dimension, it compels an equally rigid, forbidding interpretation in its domestic
dimension.”).
97
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 494 (1854).
98
Id. (“This provision is obviously intended to guard the rights and interests of the other States,
and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously
the interest of the others.”).
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He reasoned that even though the dispute rested between Florida and
Georgia, every other state in the Union had an interest in the dispute,
and their collective interests were represented by the United States as a
whole.99 After this case, it appeared as though the constitutionality of a
compact was to be determined by way of a horizontal component (i.e.,
potential effects on other states) if it did not concern a power in which
the federal government’s power was undisputedly supreme.
The more “modern” view of the Compact Clause emerged in the
dictum of Virginia v. Tennessee, another land dispute case.100 Though
his Compact Clause scrutiny was not necessary,101 Justice Field’s analysis in that case has been viewed as the turning point in the Supreme
Court’s Compact Clause jurisprudence.102 Specifically, Justice Field
said that the Compact Clause prohibited “any combination tending
to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”103
Justice Field’s application of his seemingly profound analysis boiled
down to his determination that the states were simply making formal
determinations on “that which actually existed before,”104 and thus neither state changed its relation to the federal government in a way that
would deem the agreement unconstitutional.105
In U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission,106 the Court entertained
its most significant and most recent application of the Compact Clause.
Affirming Justice Field’s dictum as binding constitutional law under the
Compact Clause,107 the Court looked at the Multistate Tax Commission,
which was composed of the member states’ respective tax administrators.108 The Commission conducted mostly advisory work in its “recognition that, as applied to multistate businesses, traditional state tax
administration was inefficient and costly to both State and taxpayer.”109
The Commission established uniform administrative regulations that
would not be binding until a given state adopted it “in accordance with

Id.
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). The Court also used this case as an opportunity
to clear up the distinction between compacts and agreements, explaining that it “d[id] not perceive
any difference in the meaning, except that the word ‘compact’ is generally used with reference to
more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term ‘agreement.’”). Id. at 520.
101
Id. at 525.
102
See Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 Akron L. Rev. 717, 732–33 (2007).
103
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
104
Id. at 520.
105
Id. at 520–21.
106
434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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Id. at 471.
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Id. at 456.
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its own law.”110 Another provision allowed the Commission to conduct
audits for member states and to use compulsory process in the courts
of member states.111 The states that formed the Commission had unilateral exit rights from the compact, and could exercise those rights by
enacting a repealing statute.112 In concluding that the compact at stake
did not require congressional consent, the Court determined that the
member states were not collectively creating a new power that they did
not already have individually.113
Though much of the majority opinion in U.S. Steel did not articulate
the circumstances that would need to occur in order for the Compact
Clause to be violated, the Court opened up the possibility that such a
circumstance might be present if the Commission had definite authority to impose punishments.114 The Court explained that the compact
granted the Commission, in its auditing capacity, the power to require
individual attendance and production of documents.115 But because the
procedure for enforcing that requirement would have to be conducted
in the same manner as it would if acted upon by a random auditing
agent, the Court concluded that the Commission had no exclusive
punishing power and thus was not providing the member states with
a benefit that they did not already have.116 After U.S. Steel, the constitutionality of an interstate compact boils down to two either/or elements:
(1) does the compact encroach on federal supremacy, or (2) does it
encroach on the sovereignty of other states?117
IV. The NPVC Should Survive A Mechanical
Application Of Existing Compact Clause Precedent
A. U.S. Steel’s magical footnote
If opponents of the NPVC claim U.S. Steel as the guiding light for
a constitutional challenge to the NPVC, they may as well concede
defeat. Unless the Compact Clause is broader than U.S. Steel purports
it to be, the NPVC does not require Congressional consent, because
it impinges only on a federal interest, not an area where the federal
Id. However, the signatories “retain[ed] complete control over all legislation and administrative
action affecting the rate of tax, the composition of the tax base (including the determination of
the components of taxable income), and the means and methods of determining tax liability and
collecting any taxes determined to be due.” U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 457.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 475–76.
114
Id. at 475.
115
U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 475.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 471.
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government has any supreme power.118 Footnote 33 in the U.S. Steel
opinion acknowledges that every interstate agreement in some way
implicates a federal interest.119 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
conceded that the Multistate Tax Compact presented a federal concern,
but that “federal interest” was an over-inclusive standard, explicitly
stating that “[t]he dissent appear[ed] to confuse potential impact on
‘federal interests’ with threats to ‘federal supremacy.’”120 Thus, if a
compact implicates a federal interest, it does not necessarily follow
that federal supremacy has also been implicated.121 Justice Powell’s
footnote acknowledged this distinction, finding that the Multistate Tax
Compact allowed states to have “[e]nhanced capacity to lobby within
the federal legislative process,” but that none of the compacting states
encroached or interfered with federal power, which “in the relevant
areas remain[ed] plenary.”122
An area of federal supremacy has been infringed by the NPVC
only if as a consequence of the legislation’s enactment, the compacting states touch on an area that the federal government has deemed to
be within its exclusive jurisdiction.123 The Framers, however, seldom
discussed the vertical relationship between state governments and
national governments in the selection of the president, as it seemed
implicit that the procedure would be conducted wholly by the states,
with a federal stamp of approval only for the final tally.124 Alexander
Hamilton acknowledged that presidential elections were to be conducted in each state, with the federal government—specifically, the
House of Representatives—stepping in only in the event that a candidate failed to receive a majority of the electoral votes.125 The U.S. Steel
plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the creation of the Multistate Tax
Commission impacted both foreign affairs and interstate commerce,
each of which were under the federal government’s plenary control.126
However, unlike in U.S. Steel, where the plaintiffs could cite to specific
Constitutional provisions that they believed had been violated, NPVC
opponents have very little authority to rely on.
See Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent? 42
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 511, 535–44 (2009) (discussing alternative modes of Compact Clause
interpretation post-U.S. Steel).
119
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 479 n.33 (1978).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
For example, the federal government would not want states to create or interfere with national
foreign policy. See Paul Brest, et. al. Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, Fifth Edition
(2011 Supplement) 121 (Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 2011).
124
The Federalist No. 68, supra note 48, at 412.
125
Id.
126
Brief for Appellants at 35–44, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)
(No. 76-635), 1977 WL 189135.
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While various statutes enforce the minimal powers that Congress
has over elections,127 NPVC opponents are left with little support for
arguing that that the NPVC encroaches on an area of distinct federal
supremacy. Accordingly, NPVC opponents will have to craft an argument
that the first prong of U.S. Steel applies broadly to all federal interests,
not just to specific constitutional provisions in which Congress has
plenary constitutional authority.128 NPVC opponents will have to work
against a slew of lower court opinions that have failed to find compacts
to have encroached on federal supremacy.129 Challenges to the NPVC
under the federal supremacy prong of the U.S. Steel test could be supported by Supreme Court language that suggests that Electoral College
delegates assume a federal responsibility when they cast their votes.130
However, the electors receive their authority to vote only from the state
legislature, and thus to truly implicate a matter of federal supremacy,
a litigant would have to argue that the electors become federal officers
when they are appointed.131
Since deciding in McPherson that states were firmly vested with
the power to choose how to allocate electors,132 the Supreme Court has
only further bolstered a state’s plenary power to choose its electors, by
saying that the federal government plays only two roles in the selection of the president: it can choose (1) when elections are held, and (2)
when the state’s pledged electors can vote.133 Presidential electors vote
wholly within their respective states; the list of whom they vote for is
then directed to the President of the Senate, who counts the votes.134
Congress’s other Article II role in the election process gives it the power
See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2011) (explaining the procedures for elector controversies).
Justice White explained in his U.S. Steel dissent how he thought the Compact Clause
contemplated a broader notion of what federal supremacy meant for scrutinizing a compact. U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 489–90 (1978).
129
For examples of cases that nicely articulate the failure of the first prong of the U.S. Steel test,
see Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 360 (4th Cir. 2002) (determining that the Master
Settlement Agreement did not abridge the federal government’s power to regulate tobacco,
as specific sections of the agreement allowed for flexible adjustments if future congressional
regulation were to be passed); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining
that an interstate compact dealing with the placement of foster children “focus[ed] wholly on
adoption and foster care of children-areas of jurisdiction historically retained by the states”);
New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F.Supp. 162, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that
an interstate compact to regulate airline advertising was valid because states had concurrent
jurisdiction with Congress in such regulation).
130
See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (“While presidential electors
are not officers or agents of the federal government, they exercise federal functions under, and
discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.”)
(internal citations omitted).
131
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952) (“[The electors] act by authority of the state that in turn
receives its authority from the federal constitution.”).
132
See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 14.
133
See Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890).
134
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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to determine when elections will be held.135 A third prong of congressional control can exist, as the House of Representatives would elect
the president by a majority vote in the event that the electors cannot
reach a majority.136 But a reading of the NPVC’s text makes it difficult to
see any provision by which the federal government can claim supreme
power over the election for president.137 Thus, the second prong of the
U.S. Steel test is where the meat of the debate must be.
B. The NPVC does not detract from states
who wish not to sign on.
The NPVC passes constitutional muster under the Compact Clause
because the only extraneous element that the NPVC guarantees is that
member states will have a security blanket in enacting their preferred
method of delegate allocation.138 The NPVC assures that it satisfies the
dispositive legal principle at work in U.S. Steel—that is, whether the
states collectively are creating a power that they did not already have
individually.139 Neither side of the NPVC debate argues that the states
do not already possess this plenary power to individually allocate their
pledged delegates to the winner of the national election; some even
point to the potentially absurd methods in which a state could allocate
its delegates, like Rhode Island’s allocating its electors the winner of
the election in Vermont.140 The question is whether the states are creating a new power in doing it collectively, or if they are constructively
legislating for non-member states by effectively nullifying that state’s
decision to allocate votes in a certain manner. 141
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
U.S. Const. amend. XII.
137
See National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
138
Justice White’s dissent in U.S. Steel explained that every time a compact is formed, it effectively
creates a new power for the compacting states.
[T]he very creation of the Compact sets it apart from separate state action. The
Compact did not become effective in any of the ratifying States until at least seven
States had adopted it. Thus, unlike reciprocal legislation, the Compact provided
a means by which a State could assure itself that a certain number of other States
would go along before committing itself to an apportionment formula.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 493 (White, J., dissenting).
The U.S. Steel majority may not have disputed Justice White’s point, because the Court
was focused mainly on whether the Compact created new powers for the States, not
if it was simply a means of assuring that it could get the desired effect out of powers
they already had. If Justice White’s articulation of the law is truly the standard, and not
subsumed within the majority’s new power analysis, then the NPVC might be evaluated
differently.
139
Id. at 475–76.
140
Tara Ross, Federalism & Separation of Powers: Legal and Logistical Ramifications of the National
Popular Vote Plan, 11 Engage 2, 40 (Sept. 2010).
141
Kristin Feeney, Guaranteeing A Federally Elected President, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1427, 1451 n.131
(2009) (arguing that even though non-signatory states are not being forced to adopt the NPVC,
other states are nullifying their electoral choices and “practically legislat[ing] for them.”).
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The interstate coordination required for the enactment of the NPVC
is akin to an assurance game. 142 While the “we can do this unilaterally, so doing it collectively shouldn’t matter” argument is plausible, it
becomes somewhat flawed when picked apart. A state would have no
incentive to allocate its electors to the national winner without knowing
that other states would follow, as such a decision would only serve to
diminish political power of the state.143 Simply put, a compacting state
would not be able to get to the desired result of a nationwide popular
vote without assurance that it would be joined by enough sister states
in making the change so that the new method of allocation would be
controlling at the Electoral College.144 Such behavior was exactly the
kind that Justice White was concerned about in his U.S. Steel dissent,
as he argued that under the Compact Clause, actions “that would
be permissible for individual states to undertake are not permissible
for a group of states to agree to undertake.”145 For states that desire a
change to a national popular vote, the less risky option is to maintain
the status quo (i.e., statewide popular election) so as not to diminish
any political power.146 The dominant strategy, at least for states that
prefer a change to a direct national vote, is to pledge its electors to
the winner of the national popular vote.147 But because of the lack of
assurance, states that want change reach an inefficient result.148 Thus,
the triggering component149 of the NPVC provides the assurance that
each signatory state can pursue the dominant strategy without having
to hope that other potential signatory states entertain the same degree
of selflessness in changing their method of allocation.150 If a court were
to look only to this coordinated behavior among the signatory states
and ignore any detrimental effects on non-signatories, such ignorance

See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82
S. Cal. L. Rev. 209, 220 (2009) (for a helpful graphical explanation of assurance game strategy).
143
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College? 7
Election L.J. 218, 224 (2008) (“The NPV[C] states need a compact only because no state wants to
be altruistic all by itself.”).
144
Id. at 224 n.35 (“If a state adopted [the] NPV[C] by itself, it could prevent the ‘wrong’ winner
from becoming president only when doing so is contrary to the state’s own internal preference.
The nature of the problem thus requires more than one state to participate in the solution.”)
145
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 482 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
146
See McAdams, supra note 142.
147
See id.
148
See id.
149
National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
150
See McAdams, supra note 142, at 221. (“Everyone wants to keep their money in the bank if
everyone else does, but wants to remove their money if enough others are going to remove
theirs . . . [T]he inefficient equilibrium results when everyone seeks to avoid the risk of pooling and
goes it alone.”)
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would presume that a Compact Clause inquiry is workable only by the
narrowly defined U.S. Steel test.151
The NPVC is distinguishable from an arrangement in which the
member states collectively merged and agreed that the voters within
the block would determine the actual person who would win the election, to the exclusion of the voting preferences of non-member states.152
Even though the member states are collectively establishing an agreement, they are still sharing power with non-member states because the
member states are not consolidating their power.153 The situation would
be different if the NPVC’s system tried to disenfranchise specific voters
in states.154 If power can be transferred simply because the signatory
states gang up and agree on the method they think is best for allocating, then the argument from the non-signatory states must be that the
purpose behind their method of allocation must be realized when the
Electoral College actually convenes.155 At best though, the NPVC only
marginalizes the satisfaction of non-member state legislatures with the
end product.156 In fact, the NPVC acknowledges and preserves the significance of individual state elections because the actual maintenance
of them is crucial in giving effect to the NPVC’s aims.157
A signatory state undoubtedly has the power to bind itself to a particular method of allocation, but might it be prevented from constructively binding another state in the process?158 If, by random chance and
without collusion, state legislatures decided to allocate their electors to
the popular vote, no problem would be presented, yet the same result
See Pincus, supra note 118, at 536 (finding merit to Justice White’s dissent in U.S. Steel and
advocating that “[a] new judicial test should give some meaning to the text of the Constitution.
Otherwise, the Compact Clause is reduced to a redundancy, serving to signify that the states
cannot do collectively what they cannot do individually.”).
152
Hendricks, supra note 143 (explaining that NPVC member states “want to pledge their votes not
to the winner within their own bloc but to the winner in the nation).
153
Id.
154
Cf. Derek Muller, More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A
Response to Professor Hendricks, 7 Election L.J. 227, 232 (2008) (explaining that the NPVC shifts
power to the signatory states because “it is the political power for a group of states to decide how
electors should be appointed, as a collective group, to the exclusion of non-compacting states.”)
155
See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 834 (“The Constitution guarantees to the states the power to
choose presidential electors, but it does not guarantee that a state’s presidential electors will have
their candidate selected president.”).
156
Hendricks, supra note 143 (“Voters in every state would retain political power over the selection
of the president.”).
157
Article III of the NPVC says that each member state will calculate the total number of votes that
“have been cast in a statewide popular election and shall add such votes together to produce a
‘national popular vote total’ for each presidential slate.” National Popular Vote Compact, supra note
8.
158
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because powers
are reserved to the States ‘respectively,’ it is clear that no State may legislate for another State.”) See
also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (explaining how states cannot exercise their Article II
plenary power in a manner that violates another part of the Constitution).
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would occur.159 So the problem is in the manner in which the NPVC
would be enacted, not its effect.160 The non-signatory states would have
to argue that the second prong of the U.S. Steel test is broader than the
facts of U.S. Steel allowed it to be and that any legislation that inflicts
negative third party externalities can be used as an affirmative basis to
show that legislation violates the Compact Clause.161 Under the NPVC,
the negative externalities would be the disruption and nullification of a
non-signatory’s power to give effect to its method of allocation.162 U.S.
Steel seems to foreclose a non-signatory state from arguing that pecuniary externalities are an affirmative defense under the second prong of
the test, though it is not clear whether political externalities can be used as
a defense.163 Thus, the Compact Clause, on its own, might not be enough
to declare that a state’s reasonable expectations have been frustrated.164 A
deeper analysis must define what those reasonable expectations are, and
what constitutional guarantees apply to them, if any.
C. Does the Guarantee Clause have the answer?
A prima facie transfer of power under a Compact Clause analysis
might be present, but only if a non-signatory state is entitled to giving effect to the protection of that power under another constitutional
provision such as the Guarantee Clause.165 Article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution declares that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”166 For purposes
of the NPVC, the Guarantee Clause might help determine if the people
in the non-signatory states are entitled to protections within their state
that cannot be frustrated by what other states might do.167

See Amanda Rolat, Testimony of Amanda Rolat Before the Committee on Government Operations and
the Environment of the Council of the District of Columbia Regarding the National Popular Vote Plan,
Brennan Center for Justice 7 (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/
Democracy/NPV_Testimony.pdf. See also, Hendricks, supra note 143, at 226.
160
U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 484 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“Judging by
effect, not form, it is obvious that non-Compact States can be placed at a competitive disadvantage
by the Multistate Tax Compact.”).
161
Greve, supra note 81, at 335 (illustrating this scenario by the following analogy: “[This] is
a lot like saying that a private firm need not fear price-fixing among its competitors because
the competitors are permitted to take unilateral actions that might put the firm out of business
anyway.”).
162
See Feeney, supra note 141.
163
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978) (“Moreover, it is not
explained how any economic pressure that does exist is an affront to the sovereignty of nonmember
States. Any time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the programs of a sister
State, pressure to modify those programs may result.”) (emphases added).
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See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 835–42.
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Id. at 835.
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U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4.
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See Turflinger, supra note 14, at 833–842.
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John Adams said he “never understood” the Guarantee Clause
and “believe[d] no man ever did or will.”168 In the famous 1793 case of
Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice Wilson articulated a “short definition” of a
republican state, saying it required “that the Supreme Power resid[e]
in the body of the people.”169 In the 1849 case of Luther v. Borden, Justice
Taney concluded that only the political branch of the government
could define what it meant to have a republican form of government.170
In Luther, the Supreme Court held that the decision to recognize which
of two Rhode Island governments was legitimate rested with Congress
and not the courts, rendering the Guarantee Clause non-justiciable.171
More than 100 years later in Baker v. Carr, the Court explained that a
political question was “primarily a function of the separation of powers” and would only come up in instances pertaining to the judiciary’s
relationship with other branches of the federal government “not of the
federal judiciary’s relationship to the States.”172
Assuming the Guarantee Clause would even become justiciable
in NPVC litigation, a litigant would have to show that non-signatory
states would no longer be accountable to their respective electorates,
at least not at the Electoral College.173 A non-signatory state would
need to demonstrate that the method of allocation it has chosen can no
longer be given effect, specifically because the enactment of the NPVC
prevented that state from making an independent decision about
its electors.174 A fair criticism of the NPVC is that it undermines the
autonomy of non-signatory states in a similar manner to how the state
of Maryland undermined federal autonomy by taxing the Bank of the
United States.175 In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall held
that even though Maryland was not forcing the federal government
to adopt any particular legislation, the tax on the Bank infringed on
a domain that was wholly within the federal government’s power.176
Using McCulloch as a basis for saying how NPVC signatory states are
horizontally disrupting a non-signatory state’s republican form of govDeborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for A Third Century,
88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (1988).
169
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793).
170
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
171
Id.
172
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily
a function of the separation of powers.”).
173
See Rolat, supra note 159, at 7 (“Regardless of what other states may choose to do, every state
remains free to appoint its own presidential electors however it sees fit, even if the NPV[C]
compact were adopted. Nothing in the Guarantee Clause prohibits this arrangement.”).
174
Feeney, supra note 141, at 1448 (explaining that a distinction between the NPVC and a system in
which states change their method of allocation to a proportional system revolves around whether
“[the] states are still making their decisions independently and as states”).
175
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 432 (1819).
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Id. at 436.
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ernment is, at best, difficult to articulate, but could potentially come
into play.177
One scholar argues that the NPVC would violate the Guarantee
Clause because it “blurs important federal lines.”178 However, signatory states already have the plenary power to blur state lines by acting
without a compact, so the coordinated state action should not be dispositive of the NPVC’s constitutionality or lack thereof.179 The NPVC
does not determine what method the non-compacting states decide to
choose, as “it is still the prerogative of each state legislature to choose
its own method.”180 Though individuals in non-signatory states might
be disappointed in the result that follows from the NPVC’s enactment,
their state legislatures will always have the means to decide how to
appoint its electors.181 Simply put, “[b]eing in the minority does not
mean that your vote is not counted; it just means that you lose.”182 Even
in the context of state autonomy, the Guarantee Clause likely would not
be invoked absent some federal constraint on non-signatory states.183
D. A State’s Plenary Article II Power in Property Lingo
Another method of articulating whether state sovereignty has been
infringed by the NPVC is to analogize the coordinated state actions to
property terms. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s framework
of distinguishing property, liability, and inalienability rules184 can be
helpful in determining if individual states can give up this power to
a compact and if the non-signatory’s powers are infringed because of
it. By vesting state legislatures with the plenary power to decide their
respective state’s method of allocation, the Constitution has effectively
given each state legislature an entitlement to that power.185 Under this
theoretical analogy, a non-signatory state could try to counter this argument by saying that even though the allocation power is plenary within
the individual states, the delegation of that power to an interstate compact (or to anything else for that matter) inflicts negative externalities
on the non-signatory states and thus requires congressional consent.186
See Feeney, supra note 141.
Id. at 1444.
179
See Rolat, supra note 159.
180
See id.
181
Hendricks, supra note 143, at 226.
182
Id.
183
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Problem of the Denominator, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 754–55 (1994) (discussing
the Guarantee Clause’s limits on federal restructuring of state governments).
184
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
185
Each state legislature has essentially been vested with a property right in deciding its method of
allocation. Id. at 1092 (providing an overview of how entitlements operate).
186
Id. at 1111 (providing an illustration of how externalities operate).
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If a property rule applies to each state’s plenary power, then a given
state legislature’s “entitlement” of choosing its preferred method of
allocation cannot be taken away unless the legislature effectively gives
it up.187 The state’s selected method of appointing electors would come
with the full bundle of property rights—the most important of which
would be the right to transfer. An NPVC signatory state legislature’s
entitlement would even prevent citizens from within that state from
claiming that the legislature has impermissibly delegated away their
right to vote in a statewide-only form of election.188 Because citizens get
the right to vote only as a result of state legislation, the state legislatures
can compact around whatever existing voting rights those citizens may
have previously been entitled to.189
If property rules govern a state legislature’s power in a particular
area, then that power is inherent in a state’s sovereign powers under
the Eleventh Amendment.190 If a liability rule applies to each state’s
plenary power, then a non-signatory state legislature’s entitlement can
be “taken” or, more appropriately, marginalized, so long as the body
or thing infringing on that entitlement appropriately compensates that
state’s legislature.191 If an inalienability rule applies, then a given state
legislature’s entitlement simply cannot be bargained away.192 At the
vertical dimension of federalism, if states have a property rule to protect their entitlements qua states, local autonomy benefits in the sense

Id. at 1105 (“No one can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless the
holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values the property.”).
188
See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938) (holding
that a compact to equitably apportion water rights on between Colorado and New Mexico on
the La Plata River was binding upon a corporation that had been previously granted irrigation
rights). Hinderlider is significant not for articulating any standard whereby a compact requires
congressional consent, but for its explanation that a compact has the effect of binding private
parties within a state, even if that state has previously granted rights in conflict with the provisions
of the compact. Id. at 106. The Court’s opinion supports the proposition that in enacting a compact,
a state, as an abstract political entity, might have greater rights than that of its citizens. Id. at 109.
Furthermore, the Court said that the taking away of a vested right would require a burdensome
showing by the private individual effected, requiring him to show a “vitiating infirmity” on the
part of the state in making its decision to enter and enforce the compact. Id. at 108–09.
189
For an articulation of this principle, see Ouellette v. International Paper Company, 666 F. Supp.
58, 61 n.1 (D. Vt. 1987) (differentiating rights that are derivative from the state from those that are
not).
190
For NPVC purposes, the question then becomes whether it is acceptable for a state to delegate
its Article II powers in the same manner that it would waive sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“In deciding whether a
State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver
only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” (quoting Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
191
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 184, at 1108–1110 (explaining how a property rule works).
192
Id. at 1111–1115 (explaining how an inalienability rule works).
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that local government can be more responsive to its constituents.193
A state legislature loses bargaining power with its constituents if it
is limited in its responsiveness to pressing concerns; this bargaining
power is further decreased if an inalienability rule attaches to a state’s
entitlement.194 Consequently, American federalism is better served if a
property rule protects a state’s plenary Article II power.195
The seminal case that best illustrates this principle is New York v.
United States, where the Supreme Court held that the state of New York
could not consent to federal legislation that incentivized states to either
comply with a federal directive or else face a penalty by “tak[ing] title”
to radioactive waste within their states and incurring liability for any
damages flowing from that waste.196 In examining this relationship of
vertical federalism, the Court concluded that even though state officials
might be incentivized to allow Congress to expand its powers beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution, state officials were nevertheless
prohibited from such acquiescence.197 More to the point, the Court
explained that the New York state government could not consent to
congressional enlargement of power because the federal structure set
up by the Constitution was designed to protect individuals, not the
states themselves. 198
Though the New York Court made this determination on Tenth
Amendment grounds, it suggested that the outcome might be different if the “take title” provision were composed by way of an interstate
compact.199 Thus, a state power that would be inalienable if conveyed
under the guise of federal commandeering might nevertheless be transferrable200 if done by way of an interstate compact.201 However, because
each state’s plenary power is not a reserved power, but rather a positive
Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in
Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2010) (“[A] property rule approach
would better serve the federalism values of local autonomy (locating decisional authority at the
local level), interjurisdictional innovation (allowing for the diversity of response that engenders
the federalism “laboratory of ideas”), and problem-solving synergy (fostering intergovernmental
partnerships to cope with interjurisdictional problems)).” See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991) (explaining how the federalism allows for greater government responsiveness).
194
See Ryan, supra note 193, at 13–14.
195
Id. at 14 (“A pro-bargaining property rule would be more consistent with the rest of the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence, more faithful to the full panoply of values that undergird American
federalism, and better for state and federal governance in the gray area.”).
196
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75, 182–83 (1992).
197
Id. at 182 (“The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the
governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch
or the States.”) (emphasis added).
198
Id. at 181.
199
Id. at 183 (“New York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact. Any estoppel
implications that might flow from membership in a compact . . . thus do not concern us here.”)
200
A power might be transferrable if it is protected by a property rule.
201
See Ryan, supra note 193, at 88–89.
193
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grant of authority from the Constitution,202 New York would only support an attack on the NPVC for its general propositions of federalism. If
a litigant used New York to explain how the NPVC is unconstitutional, a
court would have decided whether the framers designed the Electoral
College system for the benefit of individuals or for the protection of
states.203 Those against the NPVC cannot argue that compacting states
are giving up a power that the Constitution mandates they cannot
give away.204 The Electoral College sets up a system that “encourages
candidates to view states as distinct states, not simply masses of individual voters.”205 However, no individual state has a right to disrupt
the overall scheme of the Electoral College.206 Even though signatory
state legislatures are arguably delegating their ability to pick electors
to the fancies of the national will, such a delegation is permissible since
each state is making an intelligible policy decision about how it wants
to allocate electors.207 Regardless of what analogy is applied to a state’s
plenary power, non-signatory states never had any power to choose
electors other than that of their own state and cannot claim that the
NPVC has stripped them of any “property right” in their decision on
how to allocate electors.
E. In the Alternative: Withdrawal Concerns
and the Lack of a Binding Mechanism
In potential NPVC litigation, another heavily debated issue within
the second prong of the U.S. Steel test would be the potentially destructive nature of a signatory state’s unilateral withdrawal from the compact.208 The U.S. Steel Court concluded that withdrawal capabilities of
signatories was a highly relevant, but not dispositive, factor in conBush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam) (unanimous
opinion) (“[T]he legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United State
Constitution.”)
203
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“The Constitution does not protect
the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals.”)
204
Cf. Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879) (“No legislature can bargain away the
public health or the public morals.”)
205
Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and its Meager Federalism, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 195, 225 (2004).
206
Id. (“[The Electoral College] does not give states themselves any right to exercise independent
sovereignty.”). Bradley Smith thinks that “[t]he biggest federalism effect of the College may be
simply to remind both candidates and voters of the role of states in our larger federal system.”
Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7 Elec. L. J. 196,
206 (2008).
207
Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional
Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 Geo. L.J.
237, 254 n.79 (2011).
208
Williams, supra note 2, at 215–22.
202
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sidering whether an interstate agreement runs afoul of the Compact
Clause.209 The concern with the NPVC’s self-imposed July 20th blackout
date210 is that signatory state legislatures could be pressured to change
their systems back to an allocation based only on statewide vote if an
unfavorable outcome appears imminent.211 For example, if the NPVC
had been enacted in 2004, Massachusetts’s Democratic legislature
would have had to award its delegates to Republican George W. Bush,
despite John Kerry’s overwhelming victory in the statewide vote.212
Presumably though, signatory states, and the citizens within those states,
have already conceded the possibility that their electors might have to
cast votes adverse to the political will of their respective states.
The Supreme Court has also determined that once a state has signed
on to a compact, it does not retain any independent authority to interpret whether it can withdraw, as other member states will have built
up a reliance interest in the process.213 In the nation’s early Compact
Clause jurisprudence, the Court explained that a compact had the same
effect as a contract, and thus a state could not impair its own contract
by trying to pass laws that would alter or undermine it.214 Unless the
terms of the compact allow for such an exit, a state may not terminate
the agreement.215 Because a compact is an enforceable legal contract, a
state’s withdrawal from a compact would effectively amount to state
legislative action that impairs a contractual obligation, violating the
Contract Clause of the Constitution.216
Non-signatory states could interfere with the NPVC by failing to
comply with the Congressional safe harbor date for counting electoral
votes217 and by eliminating a true “popular” vote altogether from their
state.218 Specifically, a non-signatory state could vest the appointment of
U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 457, 473 (1978). It is not crystal clear from the
opinion whether the “withdrawal” factor is relevant only to the federal supremacy prong of the
Compact Clause test or if it applies to the entire Compact Clause inquiry.
210
See supra note 10.
211
Williams, supra note 2, at 215.
212
Id.
213
West Virginia ex. Rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1950) (“[The compact] requires no elaborate
argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those
who alone have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final
meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States.”). See also id. at 36 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(explaining that because the other member states of the compact developed a reliance interest
when West Virginia signed the compact, West Virginia should be estopped from exiting the
compact).
214
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1823) (“[A] State has no more power to impair an obligation
into which she herself has entered, than she can the contracts of individuals.”).
215
The U.S. Steel Court found this feature to be explicitly covered by Article X of the Multistate Tax
Compact. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 457 (1978).
216
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . ”).
217
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2011).
218
Williams, supra note 2, at 209–15.
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electors back to the state legislature, eliminating any popular vote tabulation within that state and absolving all of its voters from figuring into
the total votes that would be counted by the signatory states.219 While
that type of action would be highly unlikely to occur, it would make a
mockery of the NPVC, whose member states would count only those
votes that were cast in a “statewide popular election.”220 The enactment
of the NPVC might incentivize states to behave in such an irresponsible
manner, but the discussion of such a problem is relevant only to the
remedies of an untimely withdrawal, not whether the Compact Clause
has itself been violated. Moreover, as Congress has Article II authority
to handle some of the housekeeping measures of the Electoral College,
it could pass a statute that requires states to set a reasonable time for
changing its method of allocation once one has been selected.221
NPVC proponents might run into trouble under that criterion,
considering the compact’s July 20th deadline for compacting states
to withdraw in an election year if the NPVC is in effect.222 This selfimposed blackout date was not contemplated in the Amar brothers’
original plan, with the two professors even going so far as to rely on a
state’s ability to withdraw from the compact as being a significant reason for why the compact would not require congressional consent.223
However, wiggle room could be in the level of generality applied to the
term “withdrawal.” Signatory states could argue that even though they
cannot withdraw as states past the July 20th blackout date, the electors
from states that do not have binding statutory provisions maintain personal voting discretion and thus individually retain withdrawal power
on behalf of the state.
The diminished significance of electors was acknowledged not long
after the introduction of political parties.224 Faithless electors are rare,
and no “well-understood rules” govern their conduct.225 On a strict
reading of the NPVC, one might conclude that the legislation effectively does nothing to bind electors, as it imposes a mandate only on
state legislatures.226 Consequently, in order for these electors in signatory states to be bound, a court would have to explicitly acknowledge that the meeting of the electors is a mere formality. If a court
Id. at 215–16.
See National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
221
Amar, supra note 225, at 261 n.80.
222
See National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
223
Amar & Amar, supra note 3. (“[E]ach state would retain complete unilateral freedom to switch
back to its older system for any future election, and the coordinated law creates no new interstate
governmental apparatus.”).
224
See 1 Thomas Benton, Thirty Years’ View; Or A History Of The Working Of The American
Government For Thirty Years, From 1820 To 1850 37 (D. Appleton & Co. 1854).
225
Bennett, supra note 53, at 121 (explaining that no rules actually explain an elector’s obligation,
but that some statutes acknowledge the existence of some kind of obligation).
226
See National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8.
219
220
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determined that electors maintain their independent voting discretion at the Electoral College,227 the NPVC could potentially certify
faithless electors, allowing signatory states to pressure electors into
“withdrawing” for them.
Though the Supreme Court has not made a definitive holding on
the roles of electors at the Electoral College, it held in Ray v. Blair that
the Chairman of the Alabama Executive Committee of the Democratic
Party could refuse to certify an elector who refused to pledge his support to the eventual Democratic candidate for president.228 The Ray dissent thought that by allowing the party chairman to refuse certification,
the majority had “elevate[d] the perversion of the forefathers’ plan
into a constitutional principle.”229 The Court did not reach the issue of
whether an elector has a constitutional obligation to vote for the party
he or she is pledged to, merely saying that the Twelfth Amendment
did not serve as a bar to a political party’s requirement that a pledge
vote for the party’s eventual national nominee.230 Significantly, for
NPVC purposes, the Ray Court never explained what would happen
if an elector chose to violate his pledge.231 Even if an elector were to
be enjoined from voting for a particular candidate but did so anyway,
the subsequent legal proceedings might affect that elector individually,
yet still be of no consequence to the Electoral College.232 The faithless
elector could run away with his vote even if the political party he was
pledged to vote in accordance with sought to enjoin him.
A layer of delegates in-between the people and the actual casting
of votes was initially viewed as both as important to both the preservation of the country’s republican structure and the fear that the swaying
power of educated men would result in the public making poor choices.233 The Electoral College was introduced to its first faithless elector
in 1796, when Pennsylvania delegate Samuel Miles, who was expected
to cast his vote for John Adams, broke with his expected Federalist
The NPVC’s text does not suggest otherwise. As a baseline for defining the roles of electors,
NPVC supporters could look back to original interpretations. See The Federalist No. 68, supra note
48, at 410-13.
228
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–231 (1952). The Court had briefly mentioned the roles of electors
62 years earlier, but did not address the issue of an elector’s obligation to the party he is pledged
to. Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“The sole function of the presidential electors is to
cast, certify, and transmit the vote of the state for president and vice-president of the nation.”).
229
Ray, 343 U.S. at 234 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It may be
admitted that this law does no more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary
general practice.”)
230
See id. at 231 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
231
James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over Presidential
Elections, 27 L. & Contemp. Problems 495, 509 (1962).
232
Id.
233
Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & Pol. 665,
676 (1996). See also Madison, supra note 15.
227
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endorsement and placed his vote for Thomas Jefferson.234 Some state
courts have also acknowledged the practical responsibilities of electors
yet refrained from imposing any responsibility on the electors absent a
legislative mandate.235 Other state courts have recognized a delegate’s
legal duty to carry out his vote in accordance with the party he is
nominated to.236 Older cases seem to weigh a balancing of the mere
formality proposition, but ultimately conclude that state law cannot
fetter an elector’s discretion to vote as he so chooses.237 The problem is
hardly a current one, and the diminished significance of electors was
acknowledged not long after the introduction of political parties.238
While often never considered by the voting public, the possibility
and awareness of faithless electors is quite real.239 As recently as 2000,
George W. Bush’s campaign team was considering potential strategies on how to persuade delegates to change their votes from Gore
to Bush in the event that Gore won the Electoral College and Bush
won the popular vote.240 Prior to Election Day, the Bush campaign
was planning a media blitz in which it would prepare “talking points
about the Electoral College’s essential unfairness,” trying to pressure
Gore delegates to switch their votes.241
At least twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
enacted some form of statute that binds pledged delegates to vote for

Peirce & Longley, supra note 21, at 36. The United States Gazette later quoted a Federalist as
saying, “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas
Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think.” Id.
235
See, e.g., Wallace v. Thornton, 162 S.E.2d 273, 275 (S.C. 1968) (“Theoretically, the electors go to
the electoral college and exercise an independent judgment in choosing a President. In actuality
they go committed to vote for a certain candidate.”).
236
E.g., Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P. 1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (“They are in effect no more than
messengers whose sole duty it is to certify and transmit the election returns.”); Thomas v. Cohen,
262 N.Y.S. 320, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933) (“[T]he trust that was originally conferred upon the electors
by the people, to express their will by the selections they make, has, over these many years,
ripened into a bounden duty -- as binding upon them as if it were written into the organic law.”).
See also State v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 163 (Neb. 1912).
237
See, e.g., Bridenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (Kan. 1896) (finding no legal obligation for
electors to vote for any particular candidate and concluding that neither the secretary of state nor
the courts can interfere with an elector’s discretion).
238
See Benton, supra note 224.
239
See Bennett, supra note 53, at 122.
240
Michael Kramer, Bush Set to Fight An Electoral College Loss, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2000), http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2000-11-01/news/18145743_1_electoral-votes-popular-vote-bush-aide.
241
Id.
234
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the candidate that they have been pledged to.242 Two NPVC signatory
states, Illinois and New Jersey, have not enacted any such statutes.243
Some states impose financial244 or criminal245 penalties for failure to
vote in accordance with the party that nominated the elector. Some
states even see a benefit in maintaining elector discretion in the event
that a candidate dies between Election Day and the date the Electoral
College vote is set for. For example, Wisconsin and Tennessee bind their
electors to vote in accordance with the party that nominated them to
be delegates, but if the candidate to whom those delegates are pledged
has died before the Electoral College convenes, then those delegates
retain electoral discretion.246 The flexibility that flows from the maintenance of elector discretion allows the avoidance of House contingency
elections in the event that independent candidates prevent any one
candidate from receiving a majority of votes and the election of winning candidates who are later found to be “totalitarian or corrupt.”247
South Carolina, for example, allows for a party to relieve an elector of
his pledge if in the party’s opinion, “it would not be in the best interest
of the State for the elector to cast his ballot for such a candidate.”248
For purposes of a Compact Clause analysis, the determination of
the electors’ roles is crucial, particularly when considering the NPVC
from an ex ante perspective. When viewed ex post, the NPVC looks
unconstitutional, as the exact effect contemplated by those who argue
against the NPVC does, in fact, occur. That is, pledged delegates vote
for the winner of the national popular vote, the winner of that vote
becomes president, and the non-signatory states will have had no say
Ala. Code § 17-14-31 (West 2011); Alaska Stat. § 15.30.090 (2011); Cal. Elec. Code § 6906 (West
2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-4-304(5) (West 2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-176 (West 2011);
Del. Code Ann., tit. 15, § 4303(b) (West 2011); D.C. Code § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (West 2010); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 103.021(1) (West 2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 14-28 (West 2011); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A,
§ 805(2) (West 2010); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-505(c) (West 2011); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 168.47 (West 2011); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-785 (West 2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-104(c)
(West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, § 8 (West 2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-714, 298.050 (West
2011); N.M. Stat. § 1-15-9 (West 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-212 (West 2011); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3505.40 (West 2011); Okla. Stat. tit 26, § 26-10-102 (West 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 248.355(2);
S.C. Code. Ann. § 7-19-80 (West 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-15-104(c) (West 2011); Utah Code
Ann. § 20A-13-304 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 17, § 2732 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2203 (West 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29A.56.320 (West 2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75(2) (West
2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-19-108 (West 2011).
243
See 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 20 (West 2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011). Neither of
these statutes makes any mention of binding electors.
244
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163-212 (West 2011) (requiring that delegates pay a $500 fine if
they vote for a candidate in a party that he was not nominated by).
245
See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-9(B) (West 2011) (“Any presidential elector who casts his ballot
in violation of the provisions contained in Subsection A of this section is guilty of a fourth degree
felony.”).
246
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75(2) (West 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-15-104 (West 2011).
247
Ross & Josephson. supra note 233.
248
S.C. Code Ann. § 7-19-80 (West) (2010).
242
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in deciding how the president should be determined.249 However, when
viewed ex ante, the NPVC’s text appears to be doing something far different, as it has no binding mechanism on the actual electors, but only
on the state legislatures.250 In the New Jersey Assembly Appropriations
Committee’s Statement that follows that state’s version of the NPVC,
the legislature presumes that the bill “requires” electors from signatory states to vote for the national popular vote winner.251 However,
the bill’s text itself does not provide for any penalties if electors choose
to vote differently.252 Any binding mechanism on the actual electors
comes from the state enforcement statutes, and likely would survive
federal preemption.253
As the Ray Court made clear, neither the Constitution nor any federal statute mandates that the electors vote for the candidate whom
they are pledged for.254 Only custom has made such the practice.255
Thus, under an ex ante framing of the NPVC, the agreement to allocate
electors in a uniform manner only gives the signatory states a chance
to control the Electoral College, not a definitive guarantee that they
will control it.256 However, if all the signatory states subsequently adopt
criminal penalties or other statutes that bind the electors, then the ex
ante perspective might not have as much bite.257 While the NPVC as a
whole might be ripe for a court to evaluate prior to an election,258 the
constitutionality of a pledged delegate’s lack of adherence to the NPVC
and/or state enforcement statutes might present different questions

See Muller, supra note 80.
National Popular Vote Compact, supra note 8 (“The presidential elector certifying official of each
member state shall certify the appointment in that official’s own state of the elector slate nominated
in that state in association with the national popular vote winner.”) (emphasis added).
251
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:36-4 (West 2011).
252
Id.
253
State enforcement statutes likely would not be preempted since the NPVC does not govern the
conduct of electors, even though it would have the force of federal law. See supra note 69.
254
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952).
255
Id. at 228–30.
256
Even with such a framing of the NPVC, it would still nonetheless be regarded as a compact,
and supporters would likely be wasting time trying to argue that the NPVC should not even be
evaluated under the Compact Clause. See, e.g., Breest v. Moran, 571 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.R.I. 1983)
(“[N]ot every agreement between the states (howsoever entitled) is a ‘compact’ within the meaning
and intendment of the Compact Clause.”).
257
Even at this point, the electors would not necessarily be bound to vote for the particular
candidate, but rather would only suffer penalties if they chose to cast their vote for another
candidate. In the event that an elector broke the law, the Constitution is silent on whether his or
her vote would still count. See Benton, supra note 224, at 115 (“The Constitution requires that
a candidate receive a majority of the votes of “appointed” electors in order to avoid the House
selection procedure, and a faithless elector could then deprive a candidate of the necessary
majority and throw the process into the House.”).
258
See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (discussing the “ripeness
doctrine.”).
249
250
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either independent of the NPVC or determinative of the NPVC’s
constitutionality.259
Under this “lack of a binding mechanism” argument, the strongest
line of support for the NPVC is that while it is not airtight in all of the
possible areas of constitutional analysis, it can survive on the grounds
that it is not asking for its pledged electors to do anything more than
they are constitutionally permitted (and, arguably, mandated) to do.
As the Constitution is silent on the roles of the electors themselves, the
precise moment that a transfer of power occurs under the second prong
of the Compact Clause will not be clear until after a candidate has been
officially elected.260
Conclusion
In short, assessing the constitutionality of the NPVC is a difficult
exercise. Not only are the controlling precedents arcane and outdated,
but the applicable constitutional provisions and principles are also
dense and difficult to articulate.
The Compact Clause presents a number of hurdles for both supporters and detractors of the NPVC. The most difficult component
of a Compact Clause inquiry is defining what power, if any, is being
infringed on.261 That exercise calls for the analysis of deep philosophical questions of the rights that come with state sovereignty, making it
challenging to ascertain whether, or even if, the NPVC runs afoul of
the many principles of federalism that have already been established.
While the Compact Clause will likely be at the center of the debate
if the constitutionality of the NPVC is ever presented to a court, the
NPVC can pass constitutional muster even if it encroaches on the sovereignty of non-member states. Because the role of electors has yet to
be defined by a court, those electors retain independent withdrawal
power on behalf of compacting states.
The irony of the NPVC debate is that when enacted, the NPVC
would have little substantive change on the end result of who gets
elected.262 The change, if any, would likely come in campaign strategy,
as population centers, rather than swing states, will become the new
targets of campaign stops. The political ramifications of the NPVC,
though only tangentially related to an assessment of its constitutionSee Benton, supra note 224., at 115 (“Courts only grapple with interpretational problems after
controversy has gelled and a lawsuit has been filed. In the case of a faithless electoral vote that
seems to change the outcome of a presidential election, that will be awfully late in the game.”).
260
See Muller, supra note 80.
261
See supra, Part IV. C-E.
262
While candidates might campaign differently with the enactment of the NPVC, the actual vote
totals probably would not change significantly. See Brian P. Janiskee, “The Multiplier Effect,”
http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.376/pub_detail.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2012)
(explaining how the national vote usually tracks the Electoral College vote).
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ality, would undoubtedly figure into the Supreme Court’s calculus,
should a case about the NPVC ever get that far. Regardless of what
comes of NPVC litigation, constitutional scrutiny of it is a healthy
exercise for the country, allowing scholars to focus on the merits of
seldom-discussed constitutional clauses, the roles of electors, and the
purposes of the Electoral College.

